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中华人民共和国政府关于菲律宾共和国所提南海仲裁案管辖权问题的立场文件
发布时间:2014/12/7 已被浏览 9877

中华人民共和国政府关于菲律宾共和国所提南海仲裁案管辖权问题的立场文件

2014127日)

  一、引言

  1. 2013122日,菲律宾共和国外交部照会中华人民共和国驻菲律宾大使馆称,菲律宾依据1982年《联合国海洋法公约》(以下简称《公约》)第二百八十七条和附件七的规定,就中菲有关南海“海洋管辖权”的争端递交仲裁通知,提起强制仲裁。2013219日,中国政府退回菲律宾政府的照会及所附仲裁通知。中国政府多次郑重声明,中国不接受、不参与菲律宾提起的仲裁。

  2. 本立场文件旨在阐明仲裁庭对于菲律宾提起的仲裁没有管辖权,不就菲律宾提请仲裁事项所涉及的实体问题发表意见。本立场文件不意味着中国在任何方面认可菲律宾的观点和主张,无论菲律宾有关观点或主张是否在本立场文件中提及。本立场文件也不意味着中国接受或参与菲律宾提起的仲裁。

  3. 本立场文件将说明:菲律宾提请仲裁事项的实质是南海部分岛礁的领土主权问题,超出《公约》的调整范围,不涉及《公约》的解释或适用;以谈判方式解决有关争端是中菲两国通过双边文件和《南海各方行为宣言》所达成的协议,菲律宾单方面将中菲有关争端提交强制仲裁违反国际法;即使菲律宾提出的仲裁事项涉及有关《公约》解释或适用的问题,也构成中菲两国海域划界不可分割的组成部分,而中国已根据《公约》的规定于2006年作出声明,将涉及海域划界等事项的争端排除适用仲裁等强制争端解决程序。因此,仲裁庭对菲律宾提起的仲裁明显没有管辖权。基于上述,并鉴于各国有权自主选择争端解决方式,中国不接受、不参与菲律宾提起的仲裁有充分的国际法依据。

  二、菲律宾提请仲裁事项的实质是南海部分岛礁的领土主权问题,不涉及《公约》的解释或适用

  4. 中国对南海诸岛及其附近海域拥有无可争辩的主权。中国在南海的活动已有2000多年的历史。中国最早发现、命名和开发经营南海诸岛,最早并持续对南海诸岛实施主权管辖。20世纪30年代至40年代,日本在侵华战争期间非法侵占中国南海岛礁。第二次世界大战结束后,中国政府恢复对南海诸岛行使主权,派遣军政官员乘军舰前往南海岛礁举行接收仪式,树碑立标,派兵驻守,进行地理测量,于1947年对南海诸岛进行了重新命名,并于1948年在公开发行的官方地图上标绘南海断续线。中华人民共和国1949101日成立以来,中国政府一直坚持并采取实际行动积极维护南海诸岛的主权。1958年《中华人民共和国政府关于领海的声明》和1992年《中华人民共和国领海及毗连区法》均明确规定,中华人民共和国的领土包括东沙群岛、西沙群岛、中沙群岛和南沙群岛。上述行动一再重申了中国在南海的领土主权和相关的海洋权益。

  5. 20世纪70年代之前,菲律宾的法律对其领土范围有明确限定,没有涉及中国的南海岛礁。1935年《菲律宾共和国宪法》第一条“国家领土”明确规定:“菲律宾的领土包括根据18981210日美国同西班牙缔结的《巴黎条约》割让给美国的该条约第三条所述范围内的全部领土,连同1900117日美国同西班牙在华盛顿缔结的条约和193012日美国同英国缔结的条约中包括的所有岛屿,以及由菲律宾群岛现政府行使管辖权的全部领土。”根据上述规定,菲律宾的领土范围限于菲律宾群岛,不涉及中国的南海岛礁。1961年《关于确定菲律宾领海基线的法案》(菲律宾共和国第3046号法案)重申了菲律宾1935年宪法关于其领土范围的规定。

  6. 20世纪70年代起,菲律宾非法侵占中国南沙群岛的马欢岛、费信岛、中业岛、南钥岛、北子岛、西月岛、双黄沙洲和司令礁等岛礁;非法将中国南沙群岛部分岛礁宣布为所谓“卡拉延岛群”,对上述岛礁及其周边大范围海域提出主权主张;并对中国中沙群岛的黄岩岛提出非法领土要求。菲律宾还在有关岛礁及其附近海域非法从事资源开发等活动。

  7. 菲律宾上述行为违反《联合国宪章》和国际法,严重侵犯中国的领土主权和海洋权益,是非法、无效的。中国政府对此一贯坚决反对,一直进行严正交涉和抗议。

  8. 菲律宾将其所提仲裁事项主要归纳为以下三类:

  第一,中国在《公约》规定的权利范围之外,对“九段线”(即中国的南海断续线)内的水域、海床和底土所主张的“历史性权利”与《公约》不符;

  第二,中国依据南海若干岩礁、低潮高地和水下地物提出的200海里甚至更多权利主张与《公约》不符;

  第三,中国在南海所主张和行使的权利非法干涉菲律宾基于《公约》所享有和行使的主权权利、管辖权以及航行权利和自由。

  9. 菲律宾提请仲裁的上述事项的实质是南海部分岛礁的领土主权问题,超出《公约》的调整范围,不涉及《公约》的解释或适用。仲裁庭对菲律宾提出的这些仲裁事项均无管辖权。

  10. 关于菲律宾提出的第一类仲裁事项,很显然,菲律宾主张的核心是中国在南海的海洋权利主张超出《公约》允许的范围。然而,无论遵循何种法律逻辑,只有首先确定中国在南海的领土主权,才能判断中国在南海的海洋权利主张是否超出《公约》允许的范围。

  11. 国家的领土主权是其海洋权利的基础,这是国际法的一般原则。国际法院指出,“海洋权利源自沿海国对陆地的主权,这可概括为‘陆地统治海洋’原则”(2001年卡塔尔-巴林案判决第185段,亦参见1969年北海大陆架案判决第96段和1978年爱琴海大陆架案判决第86段),“因此陆地领土状况必须作为确定沿海国海洋权利的出发点”(2001年卡塔尔-巴林案判决第185段、2007年尼加拉瓜-洪都拉斯案判决第113段)。国际法院还强调,“国家对大陆架和专属经济区的权利基于陆地统治海洋的原则”,“陆地是一个国家对其领土向海延伸部分行使权利的法律渊源”(2012年尼加拉瓜-哥伦比亚案判决第140段)。

  12. 《公约》序言开宗明义地指出,“认识到有需要通过本公约,在妥为顾及所有国家主权的情形下,为海洋建立一种法律秩序”。显然,“妥为顾及所有国家主权”是适用《公约》确定缔约国海洋权利的前提。

  13. 就本案而言,如果不确定中国对南海岛礁的领土主权,仲裁庭就无法确定中国依据《公约》在南海可以主张的海洋权利范围,更无从判断中国在南海的海洋权利主张是否超出《公约》允许的范围。然而,领土主权问题不属于《公约》调整的范畴。

  14. 菲律宾也十分清楚,根据《公约》第二百八十七条和附件七组成的仲裁庭对于领土争端没有管辖权。菲律宾为了绕过这一法律障碍,制造提起仲裁的依据,蓄意对自己提请仲裁的实质诉求进行精心的包装。菲律宾一再表示自己不寻求仲裁庭判定哪一方对两国均主张的岛礁拥有主权,只要求仲裁庭对中国在南海所主张的海洋权利是否符合《公约》的规定进行判定,使仲裁事项看起来好像只是关于《公约》的解释或适用问题,不涉及领土主权问题。然而,菲律宾的包装无法掩饰其提请仲裁事项的实质就是南海部分岛礁的领土主权问题。

  15. 关于菲律宾提出的第二类仲裁事项,中国认为,南海部分岛礁的性质和海洋权利问题与主权问题不可分割。

  16. 首先,只有先确定岛礁的主权,才能确定基于岛礁的海洋权利主张是否符合《公约》。

  17. 《公约》规定的有关专属经济区和大陆架的海洋权利均赋予对相关陆地领土享有主权的国家。脱离了国家主权,岛礁本身不拥有任何海洋权利。只有对相关岛礁拥有主权的国家,才可以依据《公约》基于相关岛礁提出海洋权利主张。在确定了领土归属的前提下,如果其他国家对该国的海洋权利主张是否符合《公约》的规定提出质疑或者提出了重叠的海洋权利主张,才会产生关于《公约》解释或适用的争端。如果岛礁的主权归属未定,一国基于岛礁的海洋权利主张是否符合《公约》规定就不能构成一个可以提交仲裁的具体而真实的争端。

  18. 就本案而言,菲律宾不承认中国对相关岛礁拥有主权,意在从根本上否定中国依据相关岛礁主张任何海洋权利的资格。在这种情形下,菲律宾要求仲裁庭先行判断中国的海洋权利主张是否符合《公约》的规定,是本末倒置。任何国际司法或仲裁机构在审理有关岛礁争端的案件中,从未在不确定有关岛礁主权归属的情况下适用《公约》的规定先行判定这些岛礁的海洋权利。

  19. 其次,在南沙群岛中,菲律宾仅仅挑出少数几个岛礁,要求仲裁庭就其海洋权利作出裁定,实质上是否定中国对南沙群岛的领土主权。

  20. 南沙群岛包括众多岛礁。中国历来对整个南沙群岛、而非仅对其中少数几个岛礁享有主权。1935年中国政府水陆地图审查委员会出版《中国南海各岛屿图》,1948年中国政府公布《南海诸岛位置图》,均将现在所称的南沙群岛以及东沙群岛、西沙群岛和中沙群岛划入中国版图。1958年《中华人民共和国政府关于领海的声明》指出,中华人民共和国的领土包括南沙群岛。1983年中国地名委员会公布南海诸岛部分标准地名,其中包括南沙群岛的岛礁。1992年《中华人民共和国领海及毗连区法》也明确规定,中华人民共和国的陆地领土包括南沙群岛。

  21. 2011414日,中国常驻联合国代表团就有关南海问题致联合国秘书长的第CML/8/2011号照会中亦指出:“按照《联合国海洋法公约》、1992年《中华人民共和国领海及毗连区法》和1998年《中华人民共和国专属经济区和大陆架法》的有关规定,中国的南沙群岛拥有领海、专属经济区和大陆架”。显然,按照《公约》确定中国南沙群岛的海洋权利,必须考虑该群岛中的所有岛礁。

  22. 菲律宾在仲裁诉求中对南沙群岛作出“切割”,只要求对其声称的“中国占领或控制的”岛礁的海洋权利进行判定,刻意不提南沙群岛中的其他岛礁,包括至今仍为菲律宾非法侵占或主张的岛礁,旨在否定中国对整个南沙群岛的主权,否认菲律宾非法侵占或主张中国南沙群岛部分岛礁的事实,从而篡改中菲南沙群岛主权争端的性质和范围。菲律宾还刻意将中国台湾驻守的南沙群岛最大岛屿——太平岛排除在“中国占领或控制”的岛礁之外,严重违反了一个中国的原则,侵犯了中国的主权和领土完整。显而易见,此类仲裁事项的实质是中菲有关领土主权的争端。

  23. 最后,低潮高地能否被据为领土本身明显是一个领土主权问题。

  24. 菲律宾认为其仲裁诉求所涉及的几个岛礁是低潮高地,不能被据为领土。对于上述岛礁是否属于低潮高地,本立场文件不作评论。应该指出的是,无论这些岛礁具有何种性质,菲律宾自己从上世纪70年代以来却一直对这些岛礁非法主张领土主权。菲律宾1978611日颁布第1596号总统令,对包括上述岛礁在内的南沙群岛部分岛礁及其周边大范围的海域、海床、底土、大陆边及其上空主张主权,并将该区域设立为巴拉望省的一个市,命名为“卡拉延”。虽然2009310日菲律宾通过了第9522号共和国法案,规定“卡拉延岛群”(即中国南沙群岛部分岛礁)和“斯卡伯勒礁”(即中国黄岩岛)的海洋区域将与《公约》第一百二十一条(即“岛屿制度”)保持一致,但该规定仅是对上述区域内海洋地物的海洋权利主张进行了调整,并没有涉及菲律宾对这些海洋地物,包括低潮高地的领土主张。菲律宾常驻联合国代表团在201145日致联合国秘书长的第000228号照会中还明确表示:“卡拉延岛群构成菲律宾不可分割的一部分。菲律宾共和国对卡拉延岛群的地理构造拥有主权和管辖权”。菲律宾至今仍坚持其对南沙群岛中40个岛礁的主张,其中就包括菲律宾所称的低潮高地。可见,菲律宾提出低潮高地不可被据为领土,不过是想否定中国对这些岛礁的主权,从而可以将这些岛礁置于菲律宾的主权之下。

  25. 低潮高地能否被据为领土本身是一个领土主权问题,不是有关《公约》的解释或适用问题。《公约》没有关于低潮高地能否被据为领土的规定。国际法院在2001年卡塔尔-巴林案的判决中明确表示:“条约国际法对于低潮高地能否被视为领土的问题保持沉默。法院也不知道存在统一和广泛的国家实践,从而可能产生一项明确允许或排除将低潮高地据为领土的习惯法规则”(判决第205段)。这里的条约国际法当然包括1994年即已生效的《公约》。国际法院在2012年尼加拉瓜-哥伦比亚案的判决中虽然表示“低潮高地不能被据为领土”(判决第26段),但未指出此论断的法律依据,未涉及低潮高地作为群岛组成部分时的法律地位,也未涉及在历史上形成的对特定的海洋区域内低潮高地的主权或主权主张。无论如何,国际法院在该案中作出上述判定时没有适用《公约》。低潮高地能否被据为领土不是有关《公约》解释或适用的问题。

  26. 关于菲律宾提出的第三类仲裁事项,中国认为,中国在南沙群岛和黄岩岛附近海域采取行动的合法性是基于中国对有关岛礁享有的主权以及基于岛礁主权所享有的海洋权利。

  27. 菲律宾声称,中国在南海所主张和行使的权利非法干涉菲律宾基于《公约》所享有和行使的主权权利、管辖权以及航行权利和自由。菲律宾这一主张的前提是,菲律宾的海域管辖范围是明确而无争议的,中国的活动进入了菲律宾的管辖海域。然而事实并非如此。中菲尚未进行海域划界。对菲律宾这一主张进行裁定之前,首先要确定相关岛礁的领土主权,并完成相关海域划界。

  28. 需要特别指出的是,中国一贯尊重各国依据国际法在南海享有的航行自由和飞越自由。

  29. 综上所述,菲律宾要求在不确定相关岛礁主权归属的情况下,先适用《公约》的规定确定中国在南海的海洋权利,并提出一系列仲裁请求,违背了解决国际海洋争端所依据的一般国际法原则和国际司法实践。仲裁庭对菲律宾提出的任何仲裁请求作出判定,都将不可避免地直接或间接对本案涉及的相关岛礁以及其他南海岛礁的主权归属进行判定,都将不可避免地产生实际上海域划界的效果。因此,中国认为,仲裁庭对本案明显没有管辖权。

  三、通过谈判方式解决在南海的争端是中菲两国之间的协议,菲律宾无权单方面提起强制仲裁

  30. 中国在涉及领土主权和海洋权利的问题上,一贯坚持由直接有关国家通过谈判的方式和平解决争端。中菲之间就通过友好磋商和谈判解决两国在南海的争端也早有共识。

  31. 1995810日《中华人民共和国和菲律宾共和国关于南海问题和其他领域合作的磋商联合声明》指出,双方“同意遵守”下列原则:“有关争议应通过平等和相互尊重基础上的磋商和平友好地加以解决”(第一点);“双方承诺循序渐进地进行合作,最终谈判解决双方争议”(第三点);“争议应由直接有关国家解决,不影响南海的航行自由”(第八点)。

  32. 1999323日《中菲建立信任措施工作小组会议联合公报》指出,双方承诺“遵守继续通过友好磋商寻求解决分歧方法的谅解”(联合公报第5段)。“双方认为,中菲之间的磋商渠道是畅通的。他们同意通过协商和平解决争议”(联合公报第12段)。

  33. 2000516日《中华人民共和国政府和菲律宾共和国政府关于21世纪双边合作框架的联合声明》第九点规定:“双方致力于维护南海的和平与稳定,同意根据公认的国际法原则,包括1982年《联合国海洋法公约》,通过双边友好协商和谈判促进争议的和平解决。双方重申遵守1995年中菲两国关于南海问题的联合声明”。

  34. 200144日《中国-菲律宾第三次建立信任措施专家组会议联合新闻声明》第四点指出:“双方认识到两国就探讨南海合作方式所建立的双边磋商机制是富有成效的,双方所达成的一系列谅解与共识对维护中菲关系的健康发展和南海地区的和平与稳定发挥了建设性作用。”

  35. 中菲之间关于以谈判方式解决有关争端的共识在多边合作文件中也得到确认。2002114日,时任中国外交部副部长王毅作为中国政府代表与包括菲律宾在内的东盟各国政府代表共同签署了《南海各方行为宣言》(以下简称《宣言》)。《宣言》第四条明确规定,“有关各方承诺根据公认的国际法原则,包括1982年《联合国海洋法公约》,由直接有关的主权国家通过友好磋商和谈判,以和平方式解决它们的领土和管辖权争议”。

  36. 《宣言》签署后,中菲两国领导人又一再确认通过对话解决争端。200493日,时任菲律宾总统格罗丽亚·马卡帕加尔·阿罗约对中国进行国事访问,双方发表了《中华人民共和国政府和菲律宾共和国政府联合新闻公报》,“双方一致认为尽快积极落实中国与东盟于2002年签署的《南海各方行为宣言》有助于将南海变为合作之海”(联合新闻公报第16段)。

  37. 2011830日至93日,菲律宾总统贝尼尼奥·阿基诺对中国进行国事访问。91日,双方发表《中华人民共和国和菲律宾共和国联合声明》,“重申将通过和平对话处理争议”,并“重申尊重和遵守中国与东盟国家于2002年签署的《南海各方行为宣言》”(联合声明第15段)。《联合声明》确认了《宣言》第四条关于谈判解决有关争端的规定。

  38. 中菲双边文件在提及以谈判方式解决有关争端时反复使用了“同意”一词,确立两国之间相关义务的意图非常明显。《宣言》第四条使用了“承诺”一词,这也是协议中通常用以确定当事方义务的词语。国际法院在2007年波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那诉塞尔维亚和黑山关于适用《防止和惩治灭种罪公约》案的判决中对“承诺”一词有以下明确的解释:“‘承诺’这个词的一般含义是给予一个正式的诺言,以约束自己或使自己受到约束,是给予一个保证或诺言来表示同意、接受某一义务。它在规定缔约国义务的条约中经常出现······它并非只被用来提倡或表示某种目标”(判决第162段)。此外,根据国际法,一项文件无论采用何种名称和形式,只要其为当事方创设了权利和义务,这种权利和义务就具有拘束力(参见1994年卡塔尔-巴林案判决第22段至第26段;2002年喀麦隆-尼日利亚案判决第258段、第262段和第263段)。

  39. 上述中菲两国各项双边文件以及《宣言》的相关规定一脉相承,构成中菲两国之间的协议。两国据此承担了通过谈判方式解决有关争端的义务。

  40. 中菲双边文件和《宣言》第四条反复重申以谈判方式和平解决南海争端,并且规定必须在直接有关的主权国家之间进行,显然排除了第三方争端解决程序。前述1995810日《中华人民共和国和菲律宾共和国关于南海问题和其他领域合作的磋商联合声明》第三点指出“双方承诺循序渐进地进行合作,最终谈判解决双方争议”,这里的“最终”一词显然在强调“谈判”是双方唯一的争端解决方式,双方没有意向选择第三方争端解决程序。中菲双边文件和《宣言》第四条虽然没有明文使用“排除其他程序”的表述,但正如2000年南方蓝鳍金枪鱼仲裁案裁决所称:“缺少一项明示排除任何程序[的规定]不是决定性的”(裁决第57段)。如前所述,中国在涉及领土主权和海洋权利的问题上,一贯坚持由直接有关国家通过谈判的方式和平解决争端。在上述中菲双边文件和《宣言》的制订过程中,中国的这一立场始终是明确的,菲律宾及其他有关各方对此也十分清楚。

  41. 因此,对于中菲在南海的争端的所有问题,包括菲律宾提出的仲裁事项,双方同意的争端解决方式只是谈判,排除了其他任何方式。

  42. 即使菲律宾提出的仲裁事项涉及《公约》的解释或适用问题,在中菲之间已就通过谈判方式解决有关争端达成协议的情况下,《公约》第十五部分第二节的强制争端解决程序也不适用。

  43. 《公约》第二百八十条规定:“本公约的任何规定均不损害任何缔约国于任何时候协议用自行选择的任何和平方法解决它们之间有关本公约的解释或适用的争端的权利。”《公约》第二百八十一条第一款规定:“作为有关本公约的解释或适用的争端各方的缔约各国,如已协议用自行选择的和平方法来谋求解决争端,则只有在诉诸这种方法而仍未得到解决以及争端各方间的协议并不排除任何其他程序的情形下,才适用本部分所规定的程序。”

  44. 如前分析,中菲两国已通过双边、多边协议选择通过谈判方式解决有关争端,没有为谈判设定任何期限,而且排除适用任何其他程序。在此情形下,根据《公约》上述条款的规定,有关争端显然应当通过谈判方式来解决,而不得诉诸仲裁等强制争端解决程序。

  45. 菲律宾声称,1995年之后中菲两国就菲律宾仲裁请求中提及的事项多次交换意见,但未能解决争端;菲律宾有正当理由认为继续谈判已无意义,因而有权提起仲裁。事实上,迄今为止,中菲两国从未就菲律宾所提仲裁事项进行过谈判。

  46. 根据国际法,一般性的、不以争端解决为目的的交换意见不构成谈判。2011年国际法院在格鲁吉亚-俄罗斯联邦案的判决中表示,“谈判不仅是双方法律意见或利益的直接对抗,或一系列的指责和反驳,或对立主张的交换”,“谈判······至少要求争端一方有与对方讨论以期解决争端的真诚的努力”(判决第157段),且“谈判的实质问题必须与争端的实质问题相关,后者还必须与相关条约下的义务相关”(判决第161段)。

  47. 南海问题涉及多个国家,其解决绝非易事。有关各方至今仍在为最终谈判解决南海问题创造条件。在此背景下,中菲之间就有关争端交换意见,主要是应对在争议地区出现的突发事件,围绕防止冲突、减少摩擦、稳定局势、促进合作的措施而进行的。即使按照菲律宾列举的证据,这些交换意见也远未构成谈判。

  48. 近年来,中国多次向菲律宾提出建立“中菲海上问题定期磋商机制”的建议,但一直未获菲律宾答复。201191日,双方发表《中华人民共和国和菲律宾共和国联合声明》,双方再次承诺通过谈判解决南海争端。然而未待谈判正式开始,菲律宾却于2012410日动用军舰进入中国黄岩岛海域抓扣中国的渔船和渔民。对于菲律宾的挑衅性行动,中国被迫采取了维护主权的反制措施。此后,中国再次向菲律宾建议重启中菲建立信任措施磋商机制,仍未得到菲律宾回应。2012426日,菲律宾外交部照会中国驻菲律宾大使馆,提出要将黄岩岛问题提交第三方司法机构,没有表达任何谈判的意愿。2013122日,菲律宾即单方面提起了强制仲裁程序。

  49. 中菲此前围绕南海问题所进行的交换意见,也并非针对菲律宾所提的仲裁事项。例如,菲律宾援引1997522日中国外交部关于黄岩岛问题的声明,以证明中菲之间就黄岩岛的海洋权利问题存在争端并已交换意见;但菲律宾故意没有援引的是,中国外交部在声明中明确指出:“黄岩岛的问题是领土主权问题,专属经济区的开发和利用是海洋管辖权问题,两者的性质和所适用的法律规则都截然不同,不能混为一谈。菲方试图以海洋管辖权侵犯中国领土主权的企图是完全站不住脚的。”这一声明的含义是,菲律宾不得借口黄岩岛位于其主张的专属经济区范围内,否定中国对该岛的领土主权。可见,上述交换意见的核心是主权问题。

  50. 还需注意的是,菲律宾试图说明中菲两国自1995年起交换意见的事项是关于《公约》解释或适用的问题,但这是不符合事实的。历史上,菲律宾于1961617日颁布第3046号共和国法案,将位于菲律宾群岛最外缘各岛以外、由1898年美西《巴黎条约》等国际条约所确定的菲律宾边界线以内的广阔水域纳入菲律宾领海,领海的宽度大大超过12海里。菲律宾于1978611日颁布第1596号总统令,对所谓“卡拉延岛群”(即中国南沙群岛部分岛礁)及其周边大范围的海域、海床、底土、大陆边及其上空主张主权。菲律宾自己也承认,直到2009310日通过的第9522号共和国法令,菲律宾才开始使其国内法与《公约》相协调,以期完全放弃与《公约》不符的海洋权利主张。该法令首次规定,“卡拉延岛群”(即中国南沙群岛部分岛礁)和“斯卡伯勒礁”(即中国黄岩岛)的海洋区域将与《公约》第一百二十一条(即“岛屿制度”)保持一致。既然菲律宾自己都认为,其直到2009年才开始放弃以往与《公约》不符的海洋权利主张,那么何谈中菲两国自1995年起已就与本仲裁案有关的《公约》解释或适用的问题交换意见。

  51. 菲律宾声称,由于中国自己已严重违反了《宣言》的规定,所以无权援引《宣言》第四条来排除仲裁庭对本案的管辖权。上述说法严重违背事实。菲律宾指责中国采取包括威胁使用武力的行动驱离在黄岩岛海域长期、持续作业的菲律宾渔民,以及中国阻止菲律宾对在仁爱礁坐滩的军舰和人员进行补给,试图说明中国违反了《宣言》的规定。但事实是,在黄岩岛问题上,菲律宾首先采取威胁使用武力的手段,于2012410日非法派出军舰在黄岩岛海域强行扣留、逮捕中国渔船和渔民。在仁爱礁问题上,菲律宾一艘军舰于19995月以所谓“技术故障”为借口,在中国南沙群岛的仁爱礁非法坐滩。中国多次向菲律宾提出交涉,要求菲律宾立即拖走该舰。菲律宾也曾多次向中国明确承诺拖走因“技术故障”坐滩的军舰。然而15年来,菲律宾不仅违背此前承诺,拒不拖走有关军舰,反而试图在该礁上修建固定设施。2014314日,菲律宾还公开宣称其在1999年是将该军舰作为永久设施部署在仁爱礁。针对菲律宾的上述挑衅行为,中国被迫采取了必要的措施。因此,菲律宾对中国的指责是毫无道理的。

  52. 菲律宾一方面为支持其提起的仲裁而否认《宣言》第四条的效力,另一方面,却又在201481日外交部声明中提出解决南海问题的倡议,要求各方遵守《宣言》第五条的规定,并且“全面、有效执行《宣言》”。菲律宾对《宣言》所采取的这种自相矛盾、出尔反尔的做法,明显违反国际法上的诚信原则。

  53. 诚信原则要求各国对相互达成的协议作出诚实的解释,不得为了获取不正当的利益,而对协议作出违反原意的曲解。诚信原则至关重要,它体现在《联合国宪章》第二条第二款中,涉及国际法的各个方面(参见罗伯特·詹宁斯和亚瑟·瓦茨1992年所编《奥本海国际法》第9版第一卷第38页)。国际法院在1974年澳大利亚-法国核试验案的判决中指出,“指导制订和履行国际义务的基本原则之一就是诚信原则,无论这种义务是基于什么渊源,信任与信心是国际合作的根本”(判决第46段)。

  54. 中国愿借此机会强调,《宣言》是中国与东盟国家经过多年耐心的谈判,在相互尊重、互谅互让的基础上达成的重要文件。在《宣言》中,有关各方承诺由直接有关的主权国家通过友好磋商和谈判解决它们的领土和管辖权争议;各方重申以《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则、1982年《公约》、《东南亚友好合作条约》、和平共处五项原则以及其它公认的国际法原则作为处理国家间关系的基本准则;各方承诺根据上述原则,在平等和相互尊重的基础上,探讨建立信任的途径;各方重申尊重并承诺包括1982年《公约》在内的公认的国际法原则所规定的在南海的航行及飞越自由;各方承诺保持自我克制,不采取使争议复杂化、扩大化和影响和平与稳定的行动,包括不在现无人居住的岛、礁、滩、沙或其他自然构造上采取居住的行动,并以建设性的方式处理它们的分歧。此外,《宣言》还详细列出有关各方在和平解决它们的领土和管辖权争议之前,建立相互信任的途径和开展合作的领域。作为落实《宣言》的后续行动,各方承诺将磋商制定“南海行为准则”。

  55. 《宣言》对稳定南海局势、促进中国与东盟国家的海上合作和增信释疑起到了积极作用。《宣言》每项条款均构成该文件不可分割的组成部分。否定《宣言》的作用,将导致中国和东盟国家南海合作关系的严重倒退。

  56. 菲律宾作为东盟成员,参与了《宣言》的整个磋商过程,应当十分清楚《宣言》对通过谈判和平解决南海问题的重要性。目前,中国和包括菲律宾在内的东盟国家已建立工作机制积极落实《宣言》,并就“南海行为准则”展开磋商,维护南海局势的稳定,为南海问题的最终和平解决创造条件。菲律宾现在提起强制仲裁程序,与中国和东盟国家的共同愿望和努力背道而驰,其目的并非像菲律宾所标榜的那样寻求和平解决南海问题,而是试图通过仲裁向中国施加政治压力,以通过对《公约》的所谓“解释或适用”来达到否定中国在南海的合法权利,并按其单方面主张和意愿解决南海问题的目的。对此,中国当然不能接受。

  四、即使菲律宾提出的仲裁事项涉及有关《公约》解释或适用的问题,也构成海域划界不可分割的组成部分,已被中国2006年声明所排除,不得提交仲裁

  57. 《公约》第十五部分确认了缔约国可以书面声明就特定事项排除适用该部分第二节规定的强制争端解决程序。中国2006年作出此类声明,符合《公约》有关规定。

  58. 2006825日,中国根据《公约》第二百九十八条的规定向联合国秘书长提交声明。该声明称:“关于《公约》第二百九十八条第1款(a)、(b)和(c)项所述的任何争端,中华人民共和国政府不接受《公约》第十五部分第二节规定的任何程序”。也就是说,对于涉及海域划界、历史性海湾或所有权、军事和执法活动以及安理会执行《联合国宪章》所赋予的职务等争端,中国政府不接受《公约》第十五部分第二节下的任何强制争端解决程序,包括强制仲裁。中国坚信,直接有关的主权国家进行友好磋商和谈判,是和平解决中国与周边邻国间的海洋争端最有效的方式。

  59. 中国与菲律宾是海上邻国,两国属于《公约》第七十四条和第八十三条所指的“海岸相向或相邻的国家”,两国之间存在海域划界问题。由于中菲有关岛礁领土争端悬而未决,两国尚未进行海域划界谈判,但已开展合作为最终划界创造条件。

  60. 200493日,中菲双方发表《中华人民共和国政府和菲律宾共和国政府联合新闻公报》,指出“双方重申将继续致力于维护南海地区的和平与稳定。在尚未全面并最终解决南海地区的领土和海洋权益争端前,双方将继续探讨共同开发等合作”(联合新闻公报第16段)。

  61. 上述联合声明发表的前两天,经中菲两国政府批准并在两国元首的见证下,中国海洋石油总公司与菲律宾国家石油公司签署《南中国海部分海域联合海洋地震工作协议》。该协议于2005314日扩大为中国、菲律宾、越南三方之间的协议。这是有关国家加强合作,为谈判解决南海争端创造条件的有益尝试。该协议适用范围就在菲律宾此次提起仲裁所涉海域之内。

  62. 2005428日,时任中国国家主席胡锦涛对菲律宾进行国事访问期间,双方发表《中华人民共和国和菲律宾共和国联合声明》,“同意继续致力于维护南海地区的和平与稳定”,“对中国海洋石油总公司、越南油气总公司和菲律宾国家石油公司签订《南中国海协议区三方联合海洋地震工作协议》表示欢迎”(联合声明第16段)。

  63. 2007116日,时任中国国务院总理温家宝对菲律宾进行正式访问期间,双方发表《中华人民共和国和菲律宾共和国联合声明》,再次表示,“南海三方联合海洋地震工作可以成为本地区合作的一个示范。双方同意,可以探讨将下一阶段的三方合作提升到更高水平,以加强本地区建立互信的良好势头”(联合声明第12段)。

  64. 可见,中菲之间对于通过合作促进海域划界问题的最终解决已有共识。鉴于中国2006年作出的声明,菲律宾不得单方面将海域划界问题提交仲裁。

  65. 为了掩盖中菲海域划界争端的实质,绕过中国2006年声明,菲律宾将海域划界争端拆分,抽取其中几个事项作为孤立的问题提交仲裁,要求仲裁庭分别进行所谓的“法律解释”。

  66. 不难看出,菲律宾提出的各项仲裁事项,包括海洋权利主张、岛礁性质和海洋权利范围,以及海上执法活动等等,均是国际司法或仲裁机构在以往海域划界案中所审理的主要问题,也是国家间海域划界实践中需要处理的问题。这些问题属于海域划界不可分割的组成部分。

  67. 海域划界是一项整体、系统工程。《公约》第七十四条和第八十三条规定,海岸相向或相邻国家间的海域划界问题,“应在《国际法院规约》第三十八条所指国际法的基础上以协议划定,以便得到公平解决”。国际司法判例和国家实践均确认,为使海域划界取得公平的结果,必须考虑所有相关因素。基于上述,适用于海域划界的国际法,既包括《公约》,也包括一般国际法。海域划界既涉及权利基础、岛礁效力等问题,也涉及划界原则和方法,以及为实现公平解决所必须考虑的所有相关因素。

  68. 菲律宾提出的仲裁事项构成中菲海域划界不可分割的组成部分,只能在中菲海域划界的框架下,与有关当事方基于《公约》、一般国际法和长期历史实践所享有的相关权利和利益结合起来,予以综合考虑。菲律宾将中菲海域划界问题拆分并将其中的部分问题提交仲裁,势必破坏海域划界问题的整体性和不可分割性,违背海域划界应以《国际法院规约》第三十八条所指国际法为基础以及必须“考虑所有相关因素”的原则,将直接影响今后中菲海域划界问题的公平解决。

  69. 菲律宾表面上不要求进行划界,但却请求仲裁庭裁定部分岛礁是菲律宾专属经济区和大陆架的一部分,裁定中国非法干涉菲律宾对其专属经济区和大陆架享有和行使主权权利,等等。上述仲裁请求显然是要求仲裁庭确认相关海域属于菲律宾的专属经济区和大陆架,菲律宾在该海域有权行使主权权利和管辖权,这实际上是在变相地要求仲裁庭进行海域划界。菲律宾提出的各项仲裁事项,实际上已涵盖了海域划界的主要步骤和主要问题,如果仲裁庭实质审议菲律宾的各项具体主张,就等于是间接地进行了海域划界。

  70. 缔约国根据《公约》第二百九十八条作出的排除性声明理应受到尊重,菲律宾试图绕过中国排除性声明提起强制仲裁的做法是滥用《公约》规定的争端解决程序。

  71. 中国2006年排除性声明一经作出即应自动适用,其效力是,根据《公约》第二百九十九条的规定,未经中方同意,其他国家不得针对中国就相关争端单方面提交强制争端解决程序。同时,中国也放弃了就同类争端针对其他国家单方面提起强制争端解决程序的权利,体现了权利与义务的对等。

  72. 菲律宾辩称,中国作为《公约》的缔约国,按照《公约》第二百八十七条的规定,未在该条所列的四种强制争端解决程序中作出选择,应被视为已接受强制仲裁程序。这种观点是有意误导。中国2006年声明的目的和效果就是对于特定事项完全排除适用强制争端解决程序。无论中国对《公约》第二百八十七条所列的四种强制争端解决程序是否作出选择,只要是属于中国2006年声明所涵盖的争端,中国就已经明确排除了适用《公约》第十五部分第二节下的任何强制争端解决程序包括强制仲裁的可能性。

  73. 尽管菲律宾认为其所提仲裁事项不属于中方2006年声明所涵盖的争端,但在中国对此持不同看法的情况下,菲律宾应先行与中国解决该问题,然后才能决定能否提交仲裁。如果按照菲律宾的逻辑,任何国家只要单方面声称有关争端不是另一国排除性声明所排除的争端,即可单方面启动强制仲裁程序,那么《公约》第二百九十九条的规定就变得毫无意义。

  74. 自《公约》生效以来,本案是第一例在一国已作出排除性声明的情况下,另一国针对该声明所涵盖的争端单方面启动强制仲裁程序的案件。如果菲律宾这种“设计”的争端被认为可以满足强制仲裁管辖权的条件,那么可以设想,第二百九十八条所列的任何争端均可以按照菲律宾的方法与《公约》某些条款的解释或适用问题联系起来,都可以提起第十五部分第二节的强制争端解决程序。若可以如此适用《公约》,那么,《公约》第二百九十八条还有何价值?目前35个国家所作出的排除性声明还有何意义?中国认为,菲律宾单方面提起仲裁,是在滥用《公约》规定的强制争端解决程序,对《公约》争端解决机制的严肃性构成严重的挑战。

  75. 综上所述,即使菲律宾提请仲裁的事项涉及有关《公约》的解释或适用的问题,也是海域划界争端不可分割的组成部分,已被中国2006年声明所排除,菲律宾不得就此提起强制仲裁程序。

  五、中国自主选择争端解决方式的权利应得到充分尊重,中国不接受、不参与菲律宾提起的仲裁具有充分的国际法依据

  76. 根据国际法,各国享有自主选择争端解决方式的权利。任何国际司法或仲裁机构针对国家间争端行使管辖权必须以当事国的同意为基础,即“国家同意原则”。基于这一原则,出席第三次联合国海洋法会议的各国代表经过长期艰苦的谈判,作为一揽子协议,达成了《公约》第十五部分有关争端解决机制的规定。

  77. 《公约》第十五部分规定的强制争端解决程序只适用于有关《公约》解释或适用的争端;缔约国有权自行选择第十五部分规定以外的其他争端解决方式;《公约》第二百九十七条和第二百九十八条还针对特定种类的争端规定了适用强制争端解决程序的限制和例外。

  78. 《公约》第十五部分这种平衡的规定,也是许多国家决定是否成为《公约》缔约国时的重要考虑因素。在1974年第三次联合国海洋法会议第二期会议上,萨尔瓦多大使雷纳多·佳林多·波尔在介绍关于《公约》争端解决的第一份草案时强调,有必要将直接涉及国家领土完整的问题作为强制管辖的例外。否则,许多国家可能不会批准甚至不会签署《公约》(参见沙巴泰·罗森和路易斯·索恩1989年所编《1982<联合国海洋法公约>评注》第5卷第88页第297.1段)。因此,在解释和适用《公约》第十五部分的规定时,必须维护该部分的平衡和完整。

  79. 中国重视《公约》强制争端解决程序在维护国际海洋法律秩序方面的积极作用。中国作为《公约》缔约国,接受了《公约》第十五部分第二节有关强制争端解决程序的规定。但是,中国接受该规定的适用范围不包括领土主权争端,不包括中国与其他缔约国同意以自行选择的方式加以解决的争端,也不包括《公约》第二百九十七条和中国2006年根据《公约》第二百九十八条所作声明排除的所有争端。对于菲律宾所提仲裁事项,中国从未接受《公约》第十五部分第二节规定的任何强制争端解决程序。

  80. 根据国家主权原则,争端当事国可自行选择争端解决方式,《公约》对此予以确认。《公约》第二百八十条规定:“本公约的任何规定均不损害任何缔约国于任何时候协议用自行选择的任何和平方法解决它们之间有关本公约的解释或适用的争端的权利。”

  81. 当事国自行选择的争端解决方式优先于《公约》第十五部分第二节规定的强制争端解决程序。《公约》第十五部分第一节的第二百八十一条第一款规定:“作为有关本公约的解释或适用的争端各方的缔约各国,如已协议用自行选择的和平方法来谋求解决争端,则只有在诉诸这种方法而仍未得到解决以及争端各方间的协议并不排除任何其他程序的情形下,才适用本部分所规定的程序。”《公约》第二百八十六条也规定:“在第三节限制下,有关本公约的解释或适用的任何争端,如已诉诸第一节而仍未得到解决,经争端任何一方请求,应提交根据本节具有管辖权的法院或法庭。”可见,只要当事方已经自行选择争端解决方式并且排除其他任何程序,《公约》规定的强制争端解决程序就完全不适用。

  82. 缔约国自行选择争端解决方式的优先性和重要性在2000年南方蓝鳍金枪鱼仲裁案裁决中得到了进一步肯定。仲裁庭指出,“《公约》远未建立一个真正全面的、有拘束力的强制管辖制度”(裁决第62段),“《公约》第二百八十一条第一款允许缔约国将第十五部分第二节强制程序的适用限定在所有当事方均同意提交的案件”(裁决第62段)。如果第十五部分第一节的规定不能得到有效遵守,就会实质上剥夺缔约国基于国家主权自行选择争端解决方式的权利,从而违反国家同意原则,破坏《公约》第十五部分的平衡和完整。

  83. 相关司法或仲裁机构在行使确定自身管辖权方面的权力时,也必须充分尊重缔约国自行选择争端解决方式的权利。《公约》第二百八十八条第四款规定:“对于法院或法庭是否具有管辖权如果发生争端,这一问题应由该法院或法庭以裁定解决。”中国尊重相关司法或仲裁机构根据《公约》所享有的上述权力,但同时强调,相关司法或仲裁机构在行使其权力时不应损害缔约国自行选择争端解决方式的权利,不应损害国际司法或仲裁必须遵循的国家同意原则。中国认为,这是仲裁庭在适用第二百八十八条第四款的规定确定自身管辖权时所必须受到的限制。总而言之,“争端当事方是争端解决程序完全的主人”(沙巴泰·罗森和路易斯·索恩1989年所编《1982<联合国海洋法公约>评注》第5卷第20页第280.1段)。

  84. 中国尊重所有缔约国依据《公约》的规定适用强制争端解决程序的权利。同时,需要强调的是,《公约》第三百条规定:“缔约国应诚意履行根据本公约承担的义务,并应以不致构成滥用权利的方式,行使本公约所承认的权利、管辖权和自由。”菲律宾明知其所提出的仲裁事项本质上是岛礁领土主权问题,明知中国从未同意就有关争端接受强制争端解决程序,明知中菲之间存在关于通过谈判方式解决有关争端的协议,还要单方面提起强制仲裁,违反了《公约》的相关规定,无助于争端的和平解决。

  85. 鉴于上述,并基于仲裁庭对本案显然不具有管辖权,中国政府决定不接受、不参与仲裁程序,以捍卫中国自主选择争端解决方式的主权权利,确保中国依据《公约》于2006年作出的排除性声明起到应有的效力,维护《公约》第十五部分的完整性以及国际海洋法律制度的权威性和严肃性。中国的这一立场不会改变。

  六、结论

  86. 中国认为,仲裁庭对于菲律宾单方面就中菲在南海的争端提起的强制仲裁明显没有管辖权。

  第一,菲律宾提请仲裁事项的实质是南海部分岛礁的领土主权问题,超出《公约》的调整范围,不涉及《公约》的解释或适用;

  第二,以谈判方式解决在南海的争端是中菲两国通过双边文件和《宣言》所达成的协议,菲律宾单方面将中菲有关争端提交强制仲裁违反国际法;

  第三,即使菲律宾提出的仲裁事项涉及有关《公约》解释或适用的问题,也构成中菲两国海域划界不可分割的组成部分,而中国已经根据《公约》的规定于2006年作出声明,将涉及海域划界等事项的争端排除适用仲裁等强制争端解决程序;

  第四,中国从未就菲律宾提出的仲裁事项接受过《公约》规定的强制争端解决程序;仲裁庭应充分尊重缔约国自行选择争端解决方式的权利,在《公约》规定的限度内行使其确定管辖权方面的权力;菲律宾提起仲裁是对《公约》强制争端解决程序的滥用。中国不接受、不参与该仲裁具有充分的国际法依据。

  87. 中国一贯奉行睦邻友好政策,主张在和平共处五项原则基础上,通过平等协商,公平合理地解决领土争端和海域划界问题。中国认为,谈判始终是国际法认可的和平解决国际争端最直接、最有效和最普遍的方式。

  88. 经过长期的外交努力和谈判,中国与14个陆地邻国中的12个国家妥善解决了边界问题,划定和勘定的边界线长度达两万公里,占中国陆地边界总长度的90%。在海上,20001225日中国与越南通过谈判签订了《中华人民共和国和越南社会主义共和国关于两国在北部湾领海、专属经济区和大陆架的划界协定》,划定了两国在北部湾的海上边界。中国还于19971111日与日本签署了《中华人民共和国和日本国渔业协定》,200083日与韩国签署了《中华人民共和国政府和大韩民国政府渔业协定》,20051224日与朝鲜签署了《中华人民共和国政府和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府关于海上共同开发石油的协定》,作为海域划界前的临时性安排。

  89. 事实证明,只要相关国家秉持善意,在平等互利基础上进行友好协商谈判,就可以妥善地解决领土争端和海域划界问题。对于中国与菲律宾之间的有关争端,中国也坚持同样的原则和立场。

  90. 中国不认为在当事方同意的基础上将争端提交仲裁是不友好的行为。但是,在涉及领土主权和海洋权利的问题上,明知他国已明确表示不接受仲裁,明知双方已承诺通过双边直接谈判解决争端,还要强行将争端诉诸仲裁,就不能被认为是友善的行为,更不能被认为是坚持法治的精神,因为这与国际法的基本原则背道而驰,违反国际关系基本准则。这种做法不仅不可能使两国争端得到妥善解决,反而会进一步损害两国之间的互信,使两国之间的问题进一步复杂化。

  91. 近年来,菲律宾在黄岩岛和仁爱礁等问题上不断采取新的挑衅行动,不仅严重损害了中菲之间的政治互信,也破坏了中国与东盟国家共同落实《宣言》、磋商制订“南海行为准则”的良好氛围。事实上,过去几年来,在东南亚地区,不是菲律宾所描绘的“中国变得更强势”,而是菲律宾自己变得更具挑衅性。

  92. 南海问题涉及多个国家,加上各种复杂的历史背景和敏感的政治因素,需要各方的耐心和政治智慧才能实现最终解决。中国坚持认为,有关各方应当在尊重历史事实和国际法的基础上,通过协商和谈判寻求妥善的解决办法。在有关问题得到彻底解决之前,各方应当开展对话,寻求合作,维护南海的和平与稳定,不断增信释疑,为问题的最终解决创造条件。

93. 菲律宾单方面提起仲裁的做法,不会改变中国对南海诸岛及其附近海域拥有主权的历史和事实,不会动摇中国维护主权和海洋权益的决心和意志,不会影响中国通过直接谈判解决有关争议以及与本地区国家共同维护南海和平稳定的政策和立场。

Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines

2014/12/07

7 December 2014

I. Introduction

1. On 22 January 2013, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines presented a note verbale to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Philippines, stating that the Philippines submitted a Notification and Statement of Claim in order to initiate compulsory arbitration proceedings under Article 287 and Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("Convention") with respect to the dispute with China over "maritime jurisdiction" in the South China Sea. On 19 February 2013, the Chinese Government rejected and returned the Philippines' note verbale together with the attached Notification and Statement of Claim. The Chinese Government has subsequently reiterated that it will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration thus initiated by the Philippines.

2. This Position Paper is intended to demonstrate that the arbitral tribunal established at the request of the Philippines for the present arbitration ("Arbitral Tribunal") does not have jurisdiction over this case. It does not express any position on the substantive issues related to the subject-matter of the arbitration initiated by the Philippines. No acceptance by China is signified in this Position Paper of the views or claims advanced by the Philippines, whether or not they are referred to herein. Nor shall this Position Paper be regarded as China's acceptance of or participation in this arbitration.

3. This Position Paper will elaborate on the following positions:

● The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention;

● China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through negotiations. By unilaterally initiating the present arbitration, the Philippines has breached its obligation under international law;

● Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-matter of the arbitration were concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, that subject-matter would constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between the two countries, thus falling within the scope of the declaration filed by China in 2006 in accordance with the Convention, which excludes, inter alia, disputes concerning maritime delimitation from compulsory arbitration and other compulsory dispute settlement procedures;

● Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction over the present arbitration. Based on the foregoing positions and by virtue of the freedom of every State to choose the means of dispute settlement, China's rejection of and non-participation in the present arbitration stand on solid ground in international law.

II. The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention

4. China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands (the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands) and the adjacent waters. Chinese activities in the South China Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago. China was the first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the resources of the South China Sea Islands and the first to continuously exercise sovereign powers over them. From the 1930s to 1940s, Japan illegally seized some parts of the South China Sea Islands during its war of aggression against China. At the end of the Second World War, the Chinese Government resumed exercise of sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands. Military personnel and government officials were sent via naval vessels to hold resumption of authority ceremonies. Commemorative stone markers were erected, garrisons stationed, and geographical surveys conducted. In 1947, China renamed the maritime features of the South China Sea Islands and, in 1948, published an official map which displayed a dotted line in the South China Sea. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, the Chinese Government has been consistently and actively maintaining its sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands. Both the Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea of 1958 and the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1992 expressly provide that the territory of the People's Republic of China includes, among others, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands. All those acts affirm China's territorial sovereignty and relevant maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.

5. Prior to the 1970s, Philippine law had set clear limits for the territory of the Philippines, which did not involve any of China's maritime features in the South China Sea. Article 1 of the 1935 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, entitled "The National Territory", provided that "The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the limits which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington between the United States and Spain on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain on the second day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction." Under this provision, the territory of the Philippines was confined to the Philippine Islands, having nothing to do with any of China's maritime features in the South China Sea. Philippine Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", which was promulgated in 1961, reaffirmed the territorial scope of the country as laid down in the 1935 Constitution.

6. Since the 1970s, the Philippines has illegally occupied a number of maritime features of China's Nansha Islands, including Mahuan Dao, Feixin Dao, Zhongye Dao, Nanyao Dao, Beizi Dao, Xiyue Dao, Shuanghuang Shazhou and Siling Jiao. Furthermore, it unlawfully designated a so-called "Kalayaan Island Group" to encompass some of the maritime features of China's Nansha Islands and claimed sovereignty over them, together with adjacent but vast maritime areas. Subsequently, it laid unlawful claim to sovereignty over Huangyan Dao of China's Zhongsha Islands. In addition, the Philippines has also illegally explored and exploited the resources on those maritime features and in the adjacent maritime areas.

7. The Philippines' activities mentioned above have violated the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and seriously encroached upon China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. They are null and void in law. The Chinese Government has always been firmly opposed to these actions of the Philippines, and consistently and continuously made solemn representations and protests to the Philippines.

8. The Philippines has summarized its claims for arbitration in three categories:

First, China's assertion of the "historic rights" to the waters, sea-bed and subsoil within the "nine-dash line" (i.e., China's dotted line in the South China Sea) beyond the limits of its entitlements under the Convention is inconsistent with the Convention.

Second, China's claim to entitlements of 200 nautical miles and more, based on certain rocks, low-tide elevations and submerged features in the South China Sea, is inconsistent with the Convention.

Third, China's assertion and exercise of rights in the South China Sea have unlawfully interfered with the sovereign rights, jurisdiction and rights and freedom of navigation that the Philippines enjoys and exercises under the Convention.

9. The subject-matter of the Philippines' claims is in essence one of territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention. Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the claims of the Philippines for arbitration.

10. With regard to the first category of claims presented by the Philippines for arbitration, it is obvious that the core of those claims is that China's maritime claims in the South China Sea have exceeded the extent allowed under the Convention. However, whatever logic is to be followed, only after the extent of China's territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on whether China's maritime claims in the South China Sea have exceeded the extent allowed under the Convention.

11. It is a general principle of international law that sovereignty over land territory is the basis for the determination of maritime rights. As the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") stated, "maritime rights derive from the coastal State's sovereignty over the land, a principle which can be summarized as 'the land dominates the sea'" (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment of 16 March 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 97, para. 185; cf. also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment of 19 December 1978, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 36, para. 86). And, "[i]t is thus the terrestrial territorial situation that must be taken as starting point for the determination of the maritime rights of a coastal State" (Qatar v. Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 185; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 696, para. 113). Recently the ICJ again emphasized that "[t]he title of a State to the continental shelf and to the exclusive economic zone is based on the principle that the land dominates the sea", and that "the land is the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward" (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 51, para. 140).

12. The preamble of the Convention proclaims "the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans". It is apparent that "due regard for the sovereignty of all States" is the prerequisite for the application of the Convention to determine maritime rights of the States Parties.

13. As far as the present arbitration is concerned, without first having determined China's territorial sovereignty over the maritime features in the South China Sea, the Arbitral Tribunal will not be in a position to determine the extent to which China may claim maritime rights in the South China Sea pursuant to the Convention, not to mention whether China's claims exceed the extent allowed under the Convention. But the issue of territorial sovereignty falls beyond the purview of the Convention.

14. The Philippines is well aware that a tribunal established under Article 287 and Annex VII of the Convention has no jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty disputes. In an attempt to circumvent this jurisdictional hurdle and fabricate a basis for institution of arbitral proceedings, the Philippines has cunningly packaged its case in the present form. It has repeatedly professed that it does not seek from the Arbitral Tribunal a determination of territorial sovereignty over certain maritime features claimed by both countries, but rather a ruling on the compatibility of China's maritime claims with the provisions of the Convention, so that its claims for arbitration would appear to be concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, not with the sovereignty over those maritime features. This contrived packaging, however, fails to conceal the very essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration, namely, the territorial sovereignty over certain maritime features in the South China Sea.

15. With regard to the second category of claims by the Philippines, China believes that the nature and maritime entitlements of certain maritime features in the South China Sea cannot be considered in isolation from the issue of sovereignty.

16. In the first place, without determining the sovereignty over a maritime feature, it is impossible to decide whether maritime claims based on that feature are consistent with the Convention.

17. The holder of the entitlements to an exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") and a continental shelf under the Convention is the coastal State with sovereignty over relevant land territory. When not subject to State sovereignty, a maritime feature per se possesses no maritime rights or entitlements whatsoever. In other words, only the State having sovereignty over a maritime feature is entitled under the Convention to claim any maritime rights based on that feature. Only after a State's sovereignty over a maritime feature has been determined and the State has made maritime claims in respect thereof, could there arise a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, if another State questions the compatibility of those claims with the Convention or makes overlapping claims. If the sovereignty over a maritime feature is undecided, there cannot be a concrete and real dispute for arbitration as to whether or not the maritime claims of a State based on such a feature are compatible with the Convention.

18. In the present case, the Philippines denies China's sovereignty over the maritime features in question, with a view to completely disqualifying China from making any maritime claims in respect of those features. In light of this, the Philippines is putting the cart before the horse by requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to determine, even before the matter of sovereignty is dealt with, the issue of compatibility of China's maritime claims with the Convention. In relevant cases, no international judicial or arbitral body has ever applied the Convention to determine the maritime rights derived from a maritime feature before sovereignty over that feature is decided.

19. Secondly, in respect of the Nansha Islands, the Philippines selects only a few features and requests the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on their maritime entitlements. This is in essence an attempt at denying China's sovereignty over the Nansha Islands as a whole.

20. The Nansha Islands comprises many maritime features. China has always enjoyed sovereignty over the Nansha Islands in its entirety, not just over some features thereof. In 1935, the Commission of the Chinese Government for the Review of Maps of Land and Waters published the Map of Islands in the South China Sea. In 1948, the Chinese Government published the Map of the Location of the South China Sea Islands. Both maps placed under China's sovereignty what are now known as the Nansha Islands as well as the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands and the Zhongsha Islands. The Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea of 1958 declared that the territory of the People's Republic of China includes, inter alia, the Nansha Islands. In 1983, the National Toponymy Commission of China published standard names for some of the South China Sea Islands, including those of the Nansha Islands. The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1992 again expressly provides that the Nansha Islands constitutes a part of the land territory of the People's Republic of China.

21. In Note Verbale No. CML/8/2011 of 14 April 2011 addressed to Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations stated that "under the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People's Republic of China (1998), China's Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf." It is plain that, in order to determine China's maritime entitlements based on the Nansha Islands under the Convention, all maritime features comprising the Nansha Islands must be taken into account.

22. The Philippines, by requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to determine the maritime entitlements of only what it describes as the maritime features "occupied or controlled by China", has in effect dissected the Nansha Islands. It deliberately makes no mention of the rest of the Nansha Islands, including those illegally seized or claimed by the Philippines. Its real intention is to gainsay China's sovereignty over the whole of the Nansha Islands, deny the fact of its illegal seizure of or claim on several maritime features of the Nansha Islands, and distort the nature and scope of the China-Philippines disputes in the South China Sea. In addition, the Philippines has deliberately excluded from the category of the maritime features "occupied or controlled by China" the largest island in the Nansha Islands, Taiping Dao, which is currently controlled by the Taiwan authorities of China. This is a grave violation of the One-China Principle and an infringement of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This further shows that the second category of claims brought by the Philippines essentially pertains to the territorial sovereignty dispute between the two countries.

23. Finally, whether or not low-tide elevations can be appropriated is plainly a question of territorial sovereignty.

24. The Philippines asserts that some of the maritime features, about which it has submitted claims for arbitration, are low-tide elevations, thus being incapable of appropriation as territory. As to whether those features are indeed low-tide elevations, this Position Paper will not comment. It should, however, be pointed out that, whatever nature those features possess, the Philippines itself has persisted in claiming sovereignty over them since the 1970s. By Presidential Decree No. 1596, promulgated on 11 June 1978, the Philippines made known its unlawful claim to sovereignty over some maritime features in the Nansha Islands including the aforementioned features, together with the adjacent but vast areas of waters, sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin and superjacent airspace, and constituted the vast area as a new municipality of the province of Palawan, entitled "Kalayaan". Notwithstanding that Philippine Republic Act No. 9522 of 10 March 2009 stipulates that the maritime zones for the so-called "Kalayaan Island Group" (i.e., some maritime features of China's Nansha Islands) and "Scarborough Shoal" (i.e., China's Huangyan Dao) be determined in a way consistent with Article 121 of the Convention (i.e., the regime of islands), this provision was designed to adjust the Philippines' maritime claims based on those features within the aforementioned area. The Act did not vary the territorial claim of the Philippines to the relevant maritime features, including those it alleged in this arbitration as low-tide elevations. In Note Verbale No. 000228, addressed to Secretary-General of the United Nations on 5 April 2011, the Philippine Permanent Mission to the United Nations stated that, "the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) constitutes an integral part of the Philippines. The Republic of the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the geological features in the KIG." The Philippines has maintained, to date, its claim to sovereignty over 40 maritime features in the Nansha Islands, among which are the very features it now labels as low-tide elevations. It is thus obvious that the only motive behind the Philippines' assertion that low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated is to deny China's sovereignty over these features so as to place them under Philippine sovereignty.

25. Whether low-tide elevations can be appropriated as territory is in itself a question of territorial sovereignty, not a matter concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. The Convention is silent on this issue of appropriation. In its 2001 Judgment in Qatar v. Bahrain, the ICJ explicitly stated that, "International treaty law is silent on the question whether low-tide elevations can be considered to be 'territory'. Nor is the Court aware of a uniform and widespread State practice which might have given rise to a customary rule which unequivocally permits or excludes appropriation of low-tide elevations" (Qatar v. Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 101-102, para. 205). "International treaty law" plainly includes the Convention, which entered into force in 1994. In its 2012 Judgment in Nicaragua v. Colombia, while the ICJ stated that "low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated" (Nicaragua v. Colombia, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 641, para. 26), it did not point to any legal basis for this conclusory statement. Nor did it touch upon the legal status of low-tide elevations as components of an archipelago, or sovereignty or claims of sovereignty that may have long existed over such features in a particular maritime area. On all accounts, the ICJ did not apply the Convention in that case. Whether or not low-tide elevations can be appropriated is not a question concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.

26. As to the third category of the Philippines' claims, China maintains that the legality of China's actions in the waters of the Nansha Islands and Huangyan Dao rests on both its sovereignty over relevant maritime features and the maritime rights derived therefrom.

27. The Philippines alleges that China's claim to and exercise of maritime rights in the South China Sea have unlawfully interfered with the sovereign rights, jurisdiction and rights and freedom of navigation, which the Philippines is entitled to enjoy and exercise under the Convention. The premise for this claim must be that the spatial extent of the Philippines' maritime jurisdiction is defined and undisputed, and that China's actions have encroached upon such defined areas. The fact is, however, to the contrary. China and the Philippines have not delimited the maritime space between them. Until and unless the sovereignty over the relevant maritime features is ascertained and maritime delimitation completed, this category of claims of the Philippines cannot be decided upon.

28. It should be particularly emphasized that China always respects the freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by all States in the South China Sea in accordance with international law.

29. To sum up, by requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to apply the Convention to determine the extent of China's maritime rights in the South China Sea, without first having ascertained sovereignty over the relevant maritime features, and by formulating a series of claims for arbitration to that effect, the Philippines contravenes the general principles of international law and international jurisprudence on the settlement of international maritime disputes. To decide upon any of the Philippines' claims, the Arbitral Tribunal would inevitably have to determine, directly or indirectly, the sovereignty over both the maritime features in question and other maritime features in the South China Sea. Besides, such a decision would unavoidably produce, in practical terms, the effect of a maritime delimitation, which will be further discussed below in Part IV of this Position Paper. Therefore, China maintains that the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction over the present case.

III. There exists an agreement between China and the Philippines to settle their disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations, and the Philippines is debarred from unilaterally initiating compulsory arbitration

30. With regard to disputes concerning territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, China has always maintained that they should be peacefully resolved through negotiations between the countries directly concerned. In the present case, there has been a long-standing agreement between China and the Philippines on resolving their disputes in the South China Sea through friendly consultations and negotiations.

31. Under the Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines concerning Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation, issued on 10 August 1995, both sides "agreed to abide by" the principles that "[d]isputes shall be settled in a peaceful and friendly manner through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual respect" (Point 1); that "a gradual and progressive process of cooperation shall be adopted with a view to eventually negotiating a settlement of the bilateral disputes" (Point 3); and that "[d]isputes shall be settled by the countries directly concerned without prejudice to the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea" (Point 8).

32. The Joint Statement of the China-Philippines Experts Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures, issued on 23 March 1999, states that the two sides reiterated their commitment to "[t]he understanding to continue to work for a settlement of their difference through friendly consultations" (para. 5), and that "the two sides believe that the channels of consultations between China and the Philippines are unobstructed. They have agreed that the dispute should be peacefully settled through consultation" (para. 12).

33. The Joint Statement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century, issued on 16 May 2000, states in Point 9 that, "The two sides commit themselves to the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea. They agree to promote a peaceful settlement of disputes through bilateral friendly consultations and negotiations in accordance with universally-recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. They reaffirm their adherence to the 1995 joint statement between the two countries on the South China Sea ...".

34. The Joint Press Statement of the Third China-Philippines Experts' Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures, dated 4 April 2001, states in Point 4 that, "The two sides noted that the bilateral consultation mechanism to explore ways of cooperation in the South China Sea has been effective. The series of understanding and consensus reached by the two sides have played a constructive role in the maintenance of the sound development of China-Philippines relations and peace and stability of the South China Sea area."

35. The mutual understanding between China and the Philippines to settle relevant disputes through negotiations has been reaffirmed in a multilateral instrument. On 4 November 2002, Mr. Wang Yi, the then Vice Foreign Minister and representative of the Chinese Government, together with the representatives of the governments of the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), including the Philippines, jointly signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ("DOC"). Paragraph 4 of the DOC explicitly states that, "The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means ... through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea."

36. Following the signing of the DOC, the leaders of China and the Philippines have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to the settlement of disputes by way of dialogue. Thus, a Joint Press Statement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was issued on 3 September 2004 during the State visit to China by the then Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which states in paragraph 16 that, "They agreed that the early and vigorous implementation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea will pave the way for the transformation of the South China Sea into an area of cooperation."

37. Between 30 August and 3 September 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III of the Philippines paid a State visit to China. On 1 September 2011, the two sides issued a Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, which, in paragraph 15, "reiterated their commitment to addressing the disputes through peaceful dialogue" and "reaffirmed their commitments to respect and abide by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed by China and the ASEAN member countries in 2002". The Joint Statement, consequently, reaffirmed Paragraph 4 of the DOC relating to settlement of relevant disputes by negotiations.

38. The bilateral instruments between China and the Philippines repeatedly employ the term "agree" when referring to settlement of their disputes through negotiations. This evinces a clear intention to establish an obligation between the two countries in this regard. Paragraph 4 of the DOC employs the term "undertake", which is also frequently used in international agreements to commit the parties to their obligations. As the ICJ observed in its Judgment in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, "[t]he ordinary meaning of the word 'undertake' is to give a formal promise, to bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation. It is a word regularly used in treaties setting out the obligations of the Contracting Parties .... It is not merely hortatory or purposive" (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 111, para. 162). Furthermore, under international law, regardless of the designation or form the above-mentioned instruments employ, as long as they intend to create rights and obligations for the parties, these rights and obligations are binding between the parties (Cf. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 1 July 1994, I.C.J. Reports 1994, pp. 120-121, paras. 22-26; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equitorial Guinea intervening), Judgment of 10 October 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 427, 429, paras. 258, 262-263).

39. The relevant provisions in the aforementioned bilateral instruments and the DOC are mutually reinforcing and form an agreement between China and the Philippines. On that basis, they have undertaken a mutual obligation to settle their relevant disputes through negotiations.

40. By repeatedly reaffirming negotiations as the means for settling relevant disputes, and by emphasizing that negotiations be conducted by sovereign States directly concerned, the above-quoted provisions of the bilateral instruments and Paragraph 4 of the DOC obviously have produced the effect of excluding any means of third-party settlement. In particular, the above-mentioned Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines concerning Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation of 10 August 1995 stipulates in Point 3 that "a gradual and progressive process of cooperation shall be adopted with a view to eventually negotiating a settlement of the bilateral disputes". The term "eventually" in this context clearly serves to emphasize that "negotiations" is the only means the parties have chosen for dispute settlement, to the exclusion of any other means including third-party settlement procedures. Although the above-mentioned bilateral instruments and Paragraph 4 of the DOC do not use such an express phrase as "exclude other procedures of dispute settlement", as the arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case stated in its Award, "the absence of an express exclusion of any procedure ... is not decisive" (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 August 2000, p.97, para. 57). As discussed earlier, in respect of disputes relating to territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, China always insists on peaceful settlement of disputes by means of negotiations between the countries directly concerned. China's position on negotiations was made clear and well known to the Philippines and other relevant parties during the drafting and adoption of the aforementioned bilateral instruments and the DOC.

41. Consequently, with regard to all the disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, including the Philippines' claims in this arbitration, the only means of settlement as agreed by the two sides is negotiations, to the exclusion of any other means.

42. Even supposing that the Philippines' claims were concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, the compulsory procedures laid down in section 2 of Part XV of the Convention still could not be applied, given the agreement between China and the Philippines on settling their relevant disputes through negotiations.

43. Article 280 of the Convention states that, "Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice." Article 281 (1) provides that, "If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure."

44. As analysed above, through bilateral and multilateral instruments, China and the Philippines have agreed to settle their relevant disputes by negotiations, without setting any time limit for the negotiations, and have excluded any other means of settlement. In these circumstances, it is evident that, under the above-quoted provisions of the Convention, the relevant disputes between the two States shall be resolved through negotiations and there shall be no recourse to arbitration or other compulsory procedures.

45. The Philippines claims that, the two countries have been involved in exchanges of views since 1995 with regard to the subject-matter of the Philippines' claims for arbitration, without however reaching settlement, and that in its view, the Philippines is justified in believing that it is meaningless to continue the negotiations, and therefore the Philippines has the right to initiate arbitration. But the truth is that the two countries have never engaged in negotiations with regard to the subject-matter of the arbitration.

46. Under international law, general exchanges of views, without having the purpose of settling a given dispute, do not constitute negotiations. In Georgia v. Russian Federation, the ICJ held that, "Negotiations entail more than the plain opposition of legal views or interests between two parties, or the existence of a series of accusations and rebuttals, or even the exchange of claims and directly opposed counter-claims. As such, the concept of 'negotiations' … requires - at the very least - a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute" (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 132, para. 157). In addition, the ICJ considered that "the subject-matter of the negotiations must relate to the subject-matter of the dispute which, in turn, must concern the substantive obligations contained in the treaty in question" (Ibid., p. 133, para. 161).

47. The South China Sea issue involves a number of countries, and it is no easy task to solve it. Up to the present, the countries concerned are still working together to create conditions conducive to its final settlement by negotiations. Against this background, the exchanges of views between China and the Philippines in relation to their disputes have so far pertained to responding to incidents at sea in the disputed areas and promoting measures to prevent conflicts, reduce frictions, maintain stability in the region, and promote measures of cooperation. They are far from constituting negotiations even on the evidence presented by the Philippines.

48. In recent years, China has on a number of occasions proposed to the Philippines the establishment of a China-Philippines regular consultation mechanism on maritime issues. To date, there has never been any response from the Philippines. On 1 September 2011, the two countries issued a Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Philippines, reiterating the commitment to settling their disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations. But, before negotiations could formally begin, the Philippines sent on 10 April 2012 a naval vessel to the waters of China's Huangyan Dao to seize Chinese fishing boats together with the Chinese fishermen on board. In the face of such provocations, China was forced to take response measures to safeguard its sovereignty. Thereafter, China once again proposed to the Philippine Government that the two sides restart the China-Philippines consultation mechanism for confidence-building measures. That proposal again fell on deaf ears. On 26 April 2012, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs delivered a note verbale to the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines, proposing that the issue of Huangyan Dao be referred to a third-party adjudication body for resolution and indicating no willingness to negotiate. On 22 January 2013, the Philippines unilaterally initiated the present compulsory arbitration proceedings.

49. The previous exchanges of views regarding the South China Sea issue between the two countries did not concern the subject-matter of the Philippines' claims for arbitration. For instance, the Philippines cited a statement released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 22 May 1997 regarding Huangyan Dao, in order to show that there exists between the two countries a dispute concerning the maritime rights of Huangyan Dao and that the two countries had exchanged views with regard to that dispute. However, the Philippines deliberately omitted a passage from that statement, which reads: "The issue of Huangyandao is an issue of territorial sovereignty; the development and exploitation of the EEZ is a question of maritime jurisdiction, the nature of the two issues are different and hence the laws and regulations governing them are also different, and they should not be discussed together. The attempt of the Philippine side to use maritime jurisdictional rights to violate the territorial sovereignty of China is untenable." This passage makes clear the thrust of the statement: the Philippines shall not negate China's sovereignty over Huangyan Dao on the pretext that it is situated within the EEZ of the Philippines. This shows that the exchange of views in question was centred on the issue of sovereignty.

50. It should be further noted that, the Philippines has attempted to show that the subject-matter of the exchanges of views between China and the Philippines since 1995 concerns the interpretation or application of the Convention, but nothing could be farther from the truth than this. Historically, the Philippines, by Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961, proclaimed as part of its territorial sea the vast areas of sea between the most outlying islands in the Philippine archipelago and the treaty limits established in the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain in 1898, among other international treaties, thus claiming a belt of territorial sea far beyond 12 nautical miles. By Presidential Decree No. 1596 promulgated on 11 June 1978, the Philippines made its claim for sovereignty over the so-called "Kalayaan Island Group" (i.e., some maritime features of China's Nansha Islands), together with the adjacent but vast areas of waters, sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin, and superjacent airspace. As conceded by the Philippines itself, only with the adoption on 10 March 2009 of Republic Act No. 9522 did it begin the ongoing process to harmonize its domestic law with the Convention, with a view to eventually relinquishing all its maritime claims incompatible with the Convention. That Act provided, for the first time, that the maritime areas of the so-called "Kalayaan Island Group" (i.e., some maritime features of China's Nansha Islands) and "Scarborough Shoal" (i.e., China's Huangyan Dao) "shall be determined" so as to be "consistent with Article 121" of the Convention (i.e., the regime of islands). Therefore, given that the Philippines itself considers that only in 2009 did it start to abandon its former maritime claims in conflict with the Convention, how could it have started in 1995 to exchange views with China on matters concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention that are related to the present arbitration?

51. The Philippines claims that China cannot invoke Paragraph 4 of the DOC to exclude the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, given its own grave breach of the terms of the DOC. This is groundless. In support of its allegations against China, the Philippines claims that China has taken measures including the threat of force to drive away Philippine fishermen from the waters of Huangyan Dao in spite of their long-standing and continuous fishing activities in those waters, and that China has blocked the Philippines from resupplying a naval ship which ran and has stayed aground at Ren'ai Jiao and certain navy personnel on board. But the fact is that, regarding the situation at Huangyan Dao, it was the Philippines that first resorted to the threat of force by dispatching on 10 April 2012 a naval vessel to detain and arrest Chinese fishing boats and fishermen in the waters of Huangyan Dao. Regarding the situation at Ren'ai Jiao, which is a constituent part of China's Nansha Islands, the Philippines illegally ran a naval ship aground in May 1999 at that feature on the pretext of "technical difficulties". China has made repeated representations to the Philippines, demanding that the latter immediately tow away the vessel. The Philippines, for its part, had on numerous occasions made explicit undertaking to China to tow away the vessel grounded due to "technical difficulties". However, for over 15 years, instead of fulfilling that undertaking, the Philippines has attempted to construct permanent installations on Ren'ai Jiao. On 14 March 2014, the Philippines even openly declared that the vessel was deployed as a permanent installation on Ren'ai Jiao in 1999. China has been forced to take necessary measures in response to such provocative conduct. In light of these facts, the Philippines' accusations against China are baseless.

52. While it denies the effect of Paragraph 4 of the DOC for the purpose of supporting its institution of the present arbitration, the Philippines recently called on the parties to the DOC to comply with Paragraph 5 of the DOC and to provide "the full and effective implementation of the DOC", in a proposal made in its Department of Foreign Affairs statement dated 1 August 2014. This selective and self-contradictory tactic clearly violates the principle of good faith in international law.

53. The principle of good faith requires all States to honestly interpret agreements they enter into with others, not to misinterpret them in disregard of their authentic meaning in order to obtain an unfair advantage. This principle is of overriding importance and is incorporated in Article 2(2) of the Charter of the United Nations. It touches every aspect of international law (Cf. Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., 1992, vol. 1, p. 38). In the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that, "One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation" (Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 268, para. 46).

54. On this occasion, China wishes to emphasize that the DOC is an important instrument, adopted by China and the ASEAN member States following many years of arduous negotiations on the basis of mutual respect, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Under the DOC, the parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned. In addition, the parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 Convention, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations. The Parties commit themselves to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect; reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in, and overflight above, the South China Sea as provided for by universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 Convention; and undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features, and to handle their differences in a constructive manner. The DOC also lists a number of ways to build trust and areas of cooperation for the Parties concerned to seek and explore pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes. As a follow-up to the DOC, the parties have undertaken to negotiate a "Code of Conduct in the South China Sea".

55. The DOC has played a positive role in maintaining stability in the South China Sea, and in enhancing maritime cooperation, building trust and reducing misgivings between China and the ASEAN member States. Every provision of the DOC constitutes an integral part of the document. To deny the significance of the DOC will lead to a serious retrogression from the current relationship of cooperation between China and the ASEAN member States in the South China Sea.

56. As a member of the ASEAN and having been involved throughout the consultations on the DOC, the Philippines should have fully appreciated the significance of the DOC for the peaceful settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations. At present, in order to maintain stability in the region and create conditions for peaceful settlement of the South China Sea issue, China and the ASEAN member States have established working mechanisms to effectively implement the DOC, and have been engaged in consultations regarding the "Code of Conduct in the South China Sea". By initiating compulsory arbitration at this juncture, the Philippines is running counter to the common wish and joint efforts of China and the ASEAN member States. Its underlying goal is not, as the Philippines has proclaimed, to seek peaceful resolution of the South China Sea issue, but rather, by resorting to arbitration, to put political pressure on China, so as to deny China's lawful rights in the South China Sea through the so-called "interpretation or application" of the Convention, and to pursue a resolution of the South China Sea issue on its own terms. This is certainly unacceptable to China.

IV. Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-matter of the arbitration were concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, that subject-matter would still be an integral part of maritime delimitation and, having been excluded by the 2006 Declaration filed by China, could not be submitted for arbitration

57. Part XV of the Convention establishes the right for the States Parties to file a written declaration to exclude specified categories of disputes from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures as laid down in section 2 of that Part. In 2006 China filed such a declaration in full compliance with the Convention.

58. On 25 August 2006, China deposited, pursuant to Article 298 of the Convention, with Secretary-General of the United Nations a written declaration, stating that,"The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention". In other words, as regards disputes concerning maritime delimitation, historic bays or titles, military and law enforcement activities, and disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations, the Chinese Government does not accept any of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures laid down in section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, including compulsory arbitration. China firmly believes that the most effective means for settlement of maritime disputes between China and its neighbouring States is that of friendly consultations and negotiations between the sovereign States directly concerned.

59. China and the Philippines are maritime neighbours and "States with opposite or adjacent coasts" in the sense of Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention. There exists an issue of maritime delimitation between the two States. Given that disputes between China and the Philippines relating to territorial sovereignty over relevant maritime features remain unresolved, the two States have yet to start negotiations on maritime delimitation. They have, however, commenced cooperation to pave the way for an eventual delimitation.

60. On 3 September 2004, the two sides issued a Joint Press Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, stating that "[t]he two sides reaffirmed their commitment to the peace and stability in the South China Sea and their readiness to continue discussions to study cooperative activities like joint development pending the comprehensive and final settlement of territorial disputes and overlapping maritime claims in the area" (para. 16).

61. Two days before the issuance of the Joint Press Statement, upon approval by both governments and in the presence of the Heads of State of the two countries, China National Offshore Oil Corporation and Philippine National Oil Company signed the "Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in Certain Areas in the South China Sea". On 14 March 2005, the agreement was expanded to a tripartite agreement, with the participation of Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation. This is a good example of the constructive efforts made by the States concerned to enhance cooperation and create conditions for a negotiated settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea. The maritime area covered by that agreement is within that covered in the present arbitration initiated by the Philippines.

62. On 28 April 2005, during a State visit to the Philippines by the then Chinese President Hu Jintao, China and the Philippines issued a Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, in which the two sides "agreed to continue efforts to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea and ... welcomed the signing of the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea by China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation and Philippine National Oil Company" (para. 16).

63. On 16 January 2007, during the official visit to the Philippines by the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, China and the Philippines issued a Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, which stated that "the Tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the South China Sea serves as a model for cooperation in the region. They agreed that possible next steps for cooperation among the three parties should be explored to bring collaboration to a higher level and increase the momentum of trust and confidence in the region" (para. 12).

64. In light of the above, it is plain that China and the Philippines have reached mutual understanding to advance final resolution of the issue of maritime delimitation through cooperation. In any event, given China's 2006 declaration, the Philippines should not and cannot unilaterally initiate compulsory arbitration on the issue of maritime delimitation.

65. To cover up the maritime delimitation nature of the China-Philippines dispute and to sidestep China's 2006 declaration, the Philippines has split up the dispute of maritime delimitation into discrete issues and selected a few of them for arbitration, requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to render the so-called "legal interpretation" on each of them.

66. It is not difficult to see that such legal issues as those presented by the Philippines in the present arbitration, including maritime claims, the legal nature of maritime features, the extent of relevant maritime rights, and law enforcement activities at sea, are all fundamental issues dealt with in past cases of maritime delimitation decided by international judicial or arbitral bodies and in State practice concerning maritime delimitation. In short, those issues are part and parcel of maritime delimitation.

67. Maritime delimitation is an integral, systematic process. Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention stipulate that maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts "shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution". Both international jurisprudence and State practice have recognized that all relevant factors must be taken into account to achieve an equitable solution. In this light, the international law applicable to maritime delimitation includes both the Convention and general international law. Under this body of law, maritime delimitation involves a consideration of not only entitlements, effect of maritime features, and principles and methods of delimitation, but also all relevant factors that must be taken into account, in order to attain an equitable solution.

68. The issues presented by the Philippines for arbitration constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between China and the Philippines, and, as such, can only be considered under the overarching framework of maritime delimitation between China and the Philippines, and in conjunction with all the relevant rights and interests the parties concerned enjoy in accordance with the Convention, general international law, and historical or long-standing practice in the region for overall consideration. The Philippines' approach of splitting its maritime delimitation dispute with China and selecting some of the issues for arbitration, if permitted, will inevitably destroy the integrity and indivisibility of maritime delimitation and contravene the principle that maritime delimitation must be based on international law as referred to in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and that "all relevant factors must be taken into account". This will adversely affect the future equitable solution of the dispute of maritime delimitation between China and the Philippines.

69. Ostensibly, the Philippines is not seeking from the Arbitral Tribunal a ruling regarding maritime delimitation, but instead a decision, inter alia, that certain maritime features are part of the Philippines' EEZ and continental shelf, and that China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise by the Philippines of sovereign rights in its EEZ and continental shelf. But that obviously is an attempt to seek a recognition by the Arbitral Tribunal that the relevant maritime areas are part of the Philippines' EEZ and continental shelf, in respect of which the Philippines is entitled to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction. This is actually a request for maritime delimitation by the Arbitral Tribunal in disguise. The Philippines' claims have in effect covered the main aspects and steps in maritime delimitation. Should the Arbitral Tribunal address substantively the Philippines' claims, it would amount to a de facto maritime delimitation.

70. The exclusionary declarations filed by the States Parties to the Convention under Article 298 of the Convention must be respected. By initiating the present compulsory arbitration as an attempt to circumvent China's 2006 declaration, the Philippines is abusing the dispute settlement procedures under the Convention.

71. China's 2006 declaration, once filed, automatically comes into effect. Its effect, as prescribed under Article 299 of the Convention, is that, without the consent of China, no State Party can unilaterally invoke any of the compulsory procedures specified in section 2 of Part XV against China in respect of the disputes covered by that declaration. In return, China simultaneously gives up the right to unilaterally initiate compulsory procedures against other States Parties in respect of the same disputes. The rights and obligations are reciprocal in this regard.

72. The Philippines claims that, having chosen none of the four compulsory dispute settlement procedures listed under Article 287 of the Convention, China as a State Party shall therefore be deemed to have accepted compulsory arbitration. This is a deliberately misleading argument. The purpose and the effect of China's 2006 declaration is such that the disputes listed therein are fully excluded from the compulsory settlement procedures under the Convention. Whether or not China has selected any of the four compulsory procedures under Article 287, as long as a dispute falls within the scope of China's 2006 declaration, China has already explicitly excluded it from the applicability of any compulsory procedures under section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, including compulsory arbitration.

73. Although the Philippines professes that the subject-matter of the arbitration does not involve any dispute covered by China's 2006 declaration, since China holds a different view in this regard, the Philippines should first take up this issue with China, before a decision can be taken on whether or not it can be submitted for arbitration. Should the Philippines' logic in its present form be followed, any State Party may unilaterally initiate compulsory arbitration against another State Party in respect of a dispute covered by the latter's declaration in force simply by asserting that the dispute is not excluded from arbitration by that declaration. This would render the provisions of Article 299 meaningless.

74. Since the entry into force of the Convention, the present arbitration is the first case in which a State Party has unilaterally initiated compulsory arbitration in respect of a dispute covered by a declaration of another State Party under Article 298. If this twisted approach of the Philippines could be accepted as fulfilling the conditions for invoking compulsory arbitration, it could be well imagined that any of the disputes listed in Article 298 may be submitted to the compulsory procedures under section 2 of Part XV simply by connecting them, using the Philippines' approach, with the question of interpretation or application of certain provisions of the Convention. Should the above approach be deemed acceptable, the question would then arise as to whether the provisions of Article 298 could still retain any value, and whether there is any practical meaning left of the declarations so far filed by 35 States Parties under Article 298. In light of the foregoing reasons, China can only conclude that, the unilateral initiation by the Philippines of the present arbitration constitutes an abuse of the compulsory procedures provided in the Convention and a grave challenge to the solemnity of the dispute settlement mechanism under the Convention.

75. To sum up, even assuming that the subject-matter of the arbitration were concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, it would still be an integral part of the dispute of maritime delimitation between the two States. Having been excluded by China's 2006 declaration, it could not be submitted to compulsory arbitration under the Convention.

V. China's right to freely choose the means of dispute settlement must be fully respected, and its rejection of and non-participation in the present arbitration is solidly grounded in international law

76. Under international law, every State is free to choose the means of dispute settlement. The jurisdiction of any international judicial or arbitral body over an inter-State dispute depends on the prior consent of the parties to the dispute. This is known as the principle of consent in international law. It was on the basis of this principle that the States participating in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea reached, after extended and arduous negotiations, a compromise on Part XV relating to dispute settlement as a package deal.

77. The compulsory dispute settlement procedures provided in Part XV of the Convention apply only to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. States Parties are entitled to freely choose the means of settlement other than those set out in Part XV. Articles 297 and 298 of the Convention, moreover, provide for limitations on and optional exceptions to the applicability of the compulsory procedures with regard to specified categories of disputes.

78. The balance embodied in the provisions of Part XV has been a critical factor for the decision of many States to become parties to the Convention. At the second session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Ambassador Reynaldo Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, co-chair of the informal group on the settlement of disputes, on introducing the first general draft on dispute settlement, emphasized the need for exceptions from compulsory jurisdiction with respect to questions directly related to the territorial integrity of States. Otherwise, as has been noted, "a number of States might have been dissuaded from ratifying the Convention or even signing it" (Shabtai Rosenne and Louis B. Sohn (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, 1989, vol. v, p. 88, para. 297.1). It follows that the provisions of Part XV must be interpreted and applied in such a manner so as to preserve the balance in and the integrity of Part XV.

79. China highly values the positive role played by the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of the Convention in upholding the international legal order for the oceans. As a State Party to the Convention, China has accepted the provisions of section 2 of Part XV on compulsory dispute settlement procedures. But that acceptance does not mean that those procedures apply to disputes of territorial sovereignty, or disputes which China has agreed with other States Parties to settle by means of their own choice, or disputes already excluded by Article 297 and China's 2006 declaration filed under Article 298. With regard to the Philippines' claims for arbitration, China has never accepted any of the compulsory procedures of section 2 of Part XV.

80. By virtue of the principle of sovereignty, parties to a dispute may choose the means of settlement of their own accord. This has been affirmed by the Convention. Article 280 provides that, "Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice."

81. The means thus chosen by the States Parties to the Convention takes priority over the compulsory procedures set forth in section 2 of Part XV. Article 281(1) of section 1 of Part XV provides that, "If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure." Article 286 states that, "Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section." Accordingly, where parties to a dispute have already chosen a means of settlement and excluded other procedures, the compulsory procedures of the Convention shall not apply to the dispute in question.

82. The priority and significance of the means of dispute settlement chosen by States Parties to the Convention have been further affirmed in the arbitral award in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case. The tribunal recognized that the Convention "falls significantly short of establishing a truly comprehensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions", and that "States Parties ... are permitted by Article 281(1) to confine the applicability of compulsory procedures of section 2 of Part XV to cases where all parties to the dispute have agreed upon submission of their dispute to such compulsory procedures" (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, pp. 102-103, para. 62). Were the provisions of section 1 of Part XV not complied with faithfully, it would result in deprivation of the right of the States Parties to freely choose means of peaceful settlement based on State sovereignty. That would entail a breach of the principle of consent and upset the balance in and integrity of Part XV.

83. In exercise of its power to decide on its jurisdiction, any judicial or arbitral body should respect the right of the States Parties to the Convention to freely choose the means of settlement. Article 288(4) of the Convention provides that "[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal". China respects that competence of judicial or arbitral bodies under the Convention. Equally important, China would like to emphasize, the exercise of judicial or arbitral power shall not derogate from the right of the States Parties to choose the means of settlement of their own accord, or from the principle of consent which must be followed in international adjudication and arbitration. China holds that this is the constraint that the Arbitral Tribunal must abide by when considering whether or not to apply Article 288(4) in determining its jurisdiction in the present arbitration. After all, "the parties to the dispute are complete masters of the procedure to be used to settle it" (Shabtai Rosenne and Louis B. Sohn (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, 1989, vol. v, p. 20, para. 280.1).

84. China respects the right of all States Parties to invoke the compulsory procedures in accordance with the Convention. At the same time, it would call attention to Article 300 of the Convention, which provides that, "States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right." While being fully aware that its claims essentially deal with territorial sovereignty, that China has never accepted any compulsory procedures in respect of those claims, and that there has been an agreement existing between the two States to settle their relevant disputes by negotiations, the Philippines has nevertheless initiated, by unilateral action, the present arbitration. This surely contravenes the relevant provisions of the Convention, and does no service to the peaceful settlement of the disputes.

85. In view of what is stated above and in light of the manifest lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Chinese Government has decided not to accept or participate in the present arbitration, in order to preserve China's sovereign right to choose the means of peaceful settlement of its own free will and the effectiveness of its 2006 declaration, and to maintain the integrity of Part XV of the Convention as well as the authority and solemnity of the international legal regime for the oceans. This position of China will not change.

VI. Conclusions

86. It is the view of China that the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction over this arbitration, unilaterally initiated by the Philippines, with regard to disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Firstly, the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over the relevant maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and is consequently not concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention.

Secondly, there is an agreement between China and the Philippines to settle their disputes in the South China Sea by negotiations, as embodied in bilateral instruments and the DOC. Thus the unilateral initiation of the present arbitration by the Philippines has clearly violated international law.

Thirdly, even assuming that the subject-matter of the arbitration did concern the interpretation or application of the Convention, it has been excluded by the 2006 declaration filed by China under Article 298 of the Convention, due to its being an integral part of the dispute of maritime delimitation between the two States.

Fourthly, China has never accepted any compulsory procedures of the Convention with regard to the Philippines' claims for arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal shall fully respect the right of the States Parties to the Convention to choose the means of dispute settlement of their own accord, and exercise its competence to decide on its jurisdiction within the confines of the Convention. The initiation of the present arbitration by the Philippines is an abuse of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures under the Convention. There is a solid basis in international law for China's rejection of and non-participation in the present arbitration.

87. China consistently adheres to the policy of friendly relations with its neighbouring States, and strives for fair and equitable solution in respect of disputes of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation by way of negotiations on the basis of equality and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. China holds that negotiations is always the most direct, effective, and universally used means for peaceful settlement of international disputes.

88. After years of diplomatic efforts and negotiations, China has successfully resolved land boundary disputes with twelve out of its fourteen neighbours, delimiting and demarcating some 20,000 kilometres in length of land boundary in the process, which accounts for over 90% of the total length of China's land boundary. On 25 December 2000, China and Vietnam concluded, following negotiations, the Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, the Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in Beibu Bay, establishing a maritime boundary between the two States in Beibu Bay. On 11 November 1997, the Agreement on Fisheries between the People's Republic of China and Japan was signed. On 3 August 2000, the Agreement on Fisheries between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea was signed. On 24 December 2005, the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for Joint Development of Oil Resources at Sea was signed. All these are provisional arrangements pending the maritime delimitation between China and those States.

89. The facts show that, as long as States concerned negotiate in good faith and on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, territorial and maritime delimitation disputes can be resolved properly between them. This principle and position of China equally apply to its disputes with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

90. China does not consider submission by agreement of a dispute to arbitration as an unfriendly act. In respect of disputes of territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, unilateral resort to compulsory arbitration against another State, however, cannot be taken as a friendly act, when the initiating State is fully aware of the opposition of the other State to the action and the existing agreement between them on dispute settlement through negotiations. Furthermore, such action cannot be regarded as in conformity with the rule of law, as it runs counter to the basic rules and principles of international law. It will not in any way facilitate a proper settlement of the dispute between the two countries. Instead it will undermine mutual trust and further complicate the bilateral relations.

91. In recent years, the Philippines has repeatedly taken new provocative actions in respect of Huangyan Dao and Ren'ai Jiao. Such actions have gravely hindered mutual political trust between China and the Philippines, and undermined the amicable atmosphere for China and ASEAN member States to implement the DOC and consult on the proposed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. In fact, in the region of Southeast Asia, it is not China that has become "increasingly assertive"; it is the Philippines that has become increasingly provocative.

92. The issue of the South China Sea involves a number of States, and is compounded by complex historical background and sensitive political factors. Its final resolution demands patience and political wisdom from all parties concerned. China always maintains that the parties concerned shall seek proper ways and means of settlement through consultations and negotiations on the basis of respect for historical facts and international law. Pending final settlement, all parties concerned should engage in dialogue and cooperation to preserve peace and stability in the South China Sea, enhance mutual trust, clear up doubts, and create conditions for the eventual resolution of the issue.

93. The unilateral initiation of the present arbitration by the Philippines will not change the history and fact of China's sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and the adjacent waters; nor will it shake China's resolve and determination to safeguard its sovereignty and maritime rights and interests; nor will it affect the policy and position of China to resolve the relevant disputes by direct negotiations and work together with other States in the region to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.

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